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Abstract 
This paper analyses the trends in corporate and household wealth in Spain over 
the past decade. It is found that the non-financial private sector has increased its 
exposure to changes in interest rates and in financial asset prices, which suggests 
significant changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Nonetheless, it is 
documented that these effects are insufficiently reflected in the conventional 
macroeconometric models used by central banks and public- and private-sector 
analysts. This starting point is taken to reflect on the role to be played, in general, by the 
analysis of financial developments in evaluating the macroeconomic situation 
underpinning monetary policy decisions and the implications of financial imbalances for 
the conduct of economic authorities in the euro area countries.
71. INTRODUCTION 
The Spanish economy has undergone far-reaching changes in recent decades. 
Such changes have altered its position in the world economy owing both to the relative 
size and to the degree of modernisation Spain has attained. Not many years back Spain 
was still considered a developing economy, according to the terminology then used. At 
present it is among the ten biggest nations on the world stage belonging to the group of 
industrialised countries, which are in turn the most highly developed economies. 
The process has been driven by many factors. But there are, above all, three 
that have shaped some of the key features of the Spanish economy's current structure. 
First, isolation has been overcome by growing external openness culminating in EMU 
membership and full insertion into the global dynamics of the international economy. 
Second, the interventionist tradition and regulatory rigidity - which accompanied Spain's 
delayed modernisation - have been abandoned as a result of the firm resolve to 
extensively liberalise the factor, goods and services markets and refashion the public 
intervention mechanisms in the economy. And finally, a framework of macroeconomic 
stability has become firmly rooted after a hazardous course of successes and failures 
involving convergence and integration into EMU, constituting a vital basis for sustainable 
growth. 
The changes have been especially marked in the financial system, which plays a 
pivotal role in the efficient use of saving, and therefore in the determination of growth 
potential, and - of most relevance to the content of this article - in the workings of 
macroeconomic policies, particularly monetary policy. 
In recent decades the Spanish financial system has been transformed. From a 
situation where practically all financial activities were tightly corseted by numerous 
restrictions on price-setting and on investment and financing operations, and by rigid 
cross-border capital controls, it has become an essentially liberalised system. This is the 
case for prices, instruments, operations and institutions, and is reflected in the full 
freedom to conduct financial operations abroad. The regulatory framework has been re-
oriented and no longer seeks to route financial flows towards specific end-purposes and 
8to protect certain sectors and activities of the domestic economy, but to promote the 
flexible and efficient working of markets with the necessary safeguards for stability. 
Increased competition acted as the main engine of change, heightening pressure 
on financial institutions' margins and obliging them to improve their efficiency in favour 
of the intermediation of saving. Inevitably, the pressure exerted by this process, in an 
economy subject to major convulsions, saw the emergence of certain financial crises. 
These severely affected the banking system in the first half of the eighties to the point of 
prompting significant systemic risks which highlighted the inadequacy of the safety nets 
in place until then. It was thus necessary to modernise and strengthen the prudential 
supervision structures for institutions and markets and, as a result, the lines of the 
financial system map were radically redrawn. 
In parallel, the stimuli unleashed as a result of the growing freedom in financial 
practices helped spur stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, since the markets act 
as a powerful deterrent against divergent or insufficiently stable policies. For the same 
reason, financial modernisation provided for orthodox and efficient public-sector 
financing, strengthening budgetary discipline mechanisms. 
These liberalisation-based transformations have changed the institutional 
framework underpinning agents' economic and financial decisions, helping improve 
resource allocation in such a way that the greater efficiency of this process enables 
agents to have access to greater levels of welfare. At the same time, agents have 
adapted their behaviour to an environment in which the range of available options has 
increased enormously. Accordingly, the structure of private-sector balance sheets and 
the characteristics of the instruments therein have changed profoundly, altering many of 
the constituent parts on which economic policies act and on whose functioning hinge 
many aspects of the transmission of policy impulses and their final results on the 
economy. 
The aim of this article is, taking the Spanish experience, to address the influence 
of the changes in the financial system - against the background of the far-reaching 
liberalisation and modernisation of the economy - on the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, so as to draw policy implications. The following section therefore attempts 
to summarise the most significant changes in the Spanish private sector's financial 
9position in the past decade. The third section tackles the implications of these changes 
for the transmission of monetary impulses. And the final section sets out the economic 
policy consequences that may be drawn from the Spanish case. 
2. CHANGES IN THE PRIVATE-SECTOR FINANCIAL POSITION 
The depth of change in the financial system, in parallel with the increase in per 
capita income, has led the balance sheets of households and non-financial corporations 
- the relevant sector when considering the impact of financial conditions on consumption 
and investment. 
The accelerated development of the economy has been accompanied by a 
substantial increase in the wealth of households and non-financial corporations. While 
much of this increase has been in real assets, given the increased propensity of 
Spanish households to invest in housing, the financial accounts reflect substantial 
growth in holdings of financial assets. As can be seen in Chart 2.1, as a proportion of 
GDP this aggregate sector's financial assets climbed from slightly over 200% in the 
early nineties to levels hovering, and highly influenced by the ups and downs of capital 
market prices, at around 350% in the opening years of the new millennium. The phase 
of fastest growth was in the second half of the nineties. Then, the convergence criteria 
for joining EMU were met and agents could take decisions under the certainty provided 
by a sustainable environment of macroeconomic stability and sheltered from the 
turbulence accompanying the difficult exercise of monetary sovereignty without the 
necessary tradition of discipline. The revaluation of equities also contributed to these 
increases in asset holdings. 
The higher levels of income and wealth have placed the sector in a position to 
resort to a greater extent to borrowed funds, taking advantage of the facilities provided 
by rapid financial innovation and the incentives arising from a sustainable scenario of 
low-cost debt compared with what had traditionally been the case. Indeed, as can also 
be seen in Chart 2.1, the sector's debt as a proportion of GDP has grown practically in 
line with its assets.  
The expansion of the overall balance sheet of households and non-financial 
corporations has run parallel to its internationalisation, in step with the opening up of 
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markets and growing financial integration. The relative weight of external assets has 
more than tripled. From scarcely 5% of total financial assets at the outset of the nineties 
it climbed to almost 18%, with a sizable jump apparent late in the decade as a result of 
the international expansion of Spanish companies, mainly in Latin America, and the 
momentum of the international diversification of portfolios further to the adoption of the 
single currency. The share of foreign financing in total liabilities has also increased, but 
the change has been less marked, from around 12% to 15%. This asymmetry reflects 
both the obstacles posed by the structure of the capital controls in force until the early 
nineties to investment abroad and the secular tendency of the Spanish economy to 
depend on foreign saving. 
A significant aspect when assessing the role of the financial system in the 
transmission of monetary impulses is the degree of intermediation reflected by the 
presence on corporate and household balance sheets of asset or liability positions vis-à-
vis credit institutions. From this standpoint, developments have been very different on 
the sector’s asset side than on its liabilities side. The presence of instruments issued by 
credit institutions in the corporate and household asset portfolio has diminished 
continuously, stabilising at around 25% after having accounted for almost 45% of the 
total, which no doubt means a rapid advance in the financial disintermediation process. 
By contrast, liabilities to credit institutions have dipped by scarcely a few percentage 
points from the level of around 40% prevailing at the start of the reference period. That 
may be interpreted as the persistence of a model characterised by the significant 
presence of banks in respect of private-sector financing, in step with the tradition 
prevailing in continental Europe. Both phenomena are illustrated in the lower panel of 
Chart 2.1. 
To move beyond these general aspects, a distinction should be drawn between 
households, on one hand, and non-financial corporations, on the other, since their 
behaviour and their respective roles in the monetary policy transmission process differ 
considerably. 
2.1 Households
The changes in the financial behaviour of households during the period relate to 
a macroeconomic setting highly favourable to household spending decisions as a result 
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of the effects induced by EMU entry. Among other things, these involved improvements 
in expected income, cheaper financing costs and an increase in wealth. The sector’s 
saving ratio, defined as the ratio of gross saving to gross disposable income, was 
therefore on a declining trend during the second half of the nineties, dipping to a low of 
slightly over 9% during 2001, when it began to pick up slightly. The movement is more 
marked if the trajectory of net financial saving (the change in financial assets minus the 
change in financial liabilities) as a proportion of gross disposable income is taken. In this 
case the decline runs over a longer period and no clear turnaround is observable yet 
(Chart 2.2). Indeed, the modest reduction in the saving ratio is manifest in the financial 
accounts as the virtual disappearance of net household financial saving, meaning that, 
in recent years, households' lending capacity to the other sectors has been reduced to a 
minimum.  
One of the most salient features, and one with the most potential implications for 
the transmission process, has been the rapid pace at which households have incurred 
debt. Household debt in proportion to household gross disposable income has 
increased from a level of 45% in the early nineties to 90% on the latest available data. 
Given the doubling of this ratio, Spanish households, which started with a far lower 
degree of debt than that of the average for the euro area countries, have now reached 
and overtaken them in a very short time, in response to what has been perceived as a 
permanent change in the cost of financing. However, the figures for Spain are still 
considerably lower than those for the United States and the United Kingdom (second 
panel of Chart 2.2). 
From the standpoint of the composition of liabilities, it should be stressed that the 
driving force of growing debt has been the strong expansion of financing for house 
purchases. As Chart 2.2 shows, most of the growing trend of the debt ratio is 
attributable to loans tied to the increase in the sector’s real assets, normally mortgages 
increasingly taken out at floating interest rates. As a result, floating rate loans have 
come to dominate household financing instruments.1
                                                          
1 Although there are no data on the characteristics of loans granted to the household sector, 
according to financial statements by credit institutions, floating rate loans, having accounted in the 
early nineties for somewhat more than 20% of total loans extended to the other resident sectors 
(which are the best proxy for households under this sectorisation), now exceed 60%. 
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In parallel, there has been a sizable increase in household wealth both in real 
assets, through the purchase and rising value of housing, and in financial assets. The 
high increase in household financial wealth has been accompanied by changes in its 
composition which are significant for the subject tackled in this article2.  The most 
stylised features of these changes can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 2.2, which 
reflects the relative loss of significance of cash and bank deposits and an increase in 
tradeable instruments. In particular, households have significantly increased their 
holdings of shares and other equity, of shares in mutual funds and, to a lesser extent, of 
technical insurance reserves. Such a change means that, directly or indirectly, the 
relative weight of equity instruments in the household portfolio has doubled, moving onto 
an equivalent footing to the share of cash and fixed-income instruments. 
As a result of the changes to the asset side of the balance sheet of households, 
their capital incomes may be said to have become less influenced by changes in interest 
rates. Moreover, as net saving of the household sector has fallen to virtually zero in the 
last few years and debt has increased significantly, the influence of interest rate 
changes on household income should normally have weakened considerably (the 
income effect)., Against this, as the sector’s direct exposure to changes in asset values 
has risen substantially, the wealth effect of interest rate movements has become more 
relevant. 
2.2 Non-financial corporations
The balance sheet of non-financial corporations has increased along similar lines 
to that of households, but at a slightly higher rate. As a proportion of GDP, the sector’s 
liabilities have risen from 150% at the start of the period to around 280% on the latest 
data. Non-financial corporations’ debt as a proportion of the gross operating surplus has 
climbed from a level of less than 250% in the mid-nineties, which was below that of the 
euro area average, to close to 450% at the end of the period, exceeding the euro area 
reference (Chart 2.3). Nonetheless, in terms of equities valued at market prices, the 
corporate debt ratio remains in Spain below that in the euro area throughout the period, 
reflecting a lesser degree of financial leverage. 
                                                          
2 A detailed description and thorough assessment of some of the related consequences can be found 
in Maza and Sanchís (2003) 
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The composition of liabilities, though naturally affected by the valuation effects 
prompted by stock market swings, has held relatively stable. Companies have resorted 
more to the markets to increase their capital through share issues, but external 
borrowing has continued to reside predominantly on credit, with the exiguous role 
played by bond issues even diminishing in importance. The relative significance of trade 
credits has declined somewhat and the share of residents’ loans has diminished in 
favour of greater resort to foreign credit (third panel of Chart 2.3). 
The increasing internationalisation of corporations that can be seen in the 
increased resort to borrowed funds is particularly visible in the rise in foreign assets on 
the balance sheet. These have climbed from somewhat over 5% of total assets to a 
level exceeding 25%, reflecting the forceful investment drive by Spanish firms abroad 
(fourth panel of Chart 2.3). Between 1997 and 2000, Spanish foreign direct investment 
position as a proportion of GDP increased threefold from around 10% to over 30%. 
All these changes considerably heighten the sensitivity of the financial position of 
companies, and therefore of their decisions, to movements in interest rates and to 
international events that are transmitted through exchange rate movements, external 
financial conditions and the capital markets on which the companies are present. 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
The development of the Spanish financial system and the changes in the 
institutional environment have contributed to relaxing some of the restrictions that limited 
the ability of households and non-financial firms to distribute their spending decisions 
over time. This should have made consumption and investment less dependent on 
current income and more sensitive to their respective opportunity costs and, therefore, 
to changes in interest rates. Moreover, as seen in the previous section, changes in the 
balance sheets of households and firms and, in particular, their increased indebtedness 
may have also contributed to strengthening the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to private expenditure. 
In frictionless economies, changes in agents’ net financial position only affect 
their spending decisions insofar as they are associated with future income flows. 
However, in the presence of restrictions on the supply of credit, changes in net worth 
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may change the availability of financing to agents and thereby affect their patterns of 
consumption and investment. The literature on the “financial accelerator”3 has 
highlighted the empirical relevance of the transmission channel that runs through 
private-sector balance sheets. In the case of Spain, the changes seen in the level of 
debt and in the composition of the assets of corporations and, in particular, of 
households, might be expected to have reinforced the response of the economy’s 
consumption and investment to changes in interest rates and in the prices of real and 
financial assets. 
3.1 Macroeconomic evidence
A direct way of analysing the changes in the transmission mechanism is to 
analyse the stability of the parameters in the econometric specifications of the 
consumption and investment functions. Using the quarterly model of the Spanish 
economy (see Estrada et al. 2004) it is possible to analyse the effects on domestic 
spending of changes in the relevant monetary and financial conditions. This model does 
not have a well-developed financial block, but it does incorporate financial and housing 
wealth in the consumption function and a cash-flow variable in the investment function, 
as well as obviously including the effect of interest rates on the opportunity cost of both 
types of spending decision. 
In general, the parameters of the long-term relationships show no sign of 
instability. Nor is it easy to formally reject the hypothesis that the short-term parameters 
of the equations are stable. However, it is likely that those tests had little power to 
identify recent changes in the sensitivity of consumption and investment to certain 
relevant financial variables. To analyse this possibility it is useful to compare recursive 
and rolling estimations of the macroeconometric model. 
Chart 3.1 shows the results of annual recursive estimation of the short-term 
coefficients of the private consumption equation corresponding to the interest rate and 
to the financial and non-financial wealth of agents4 for the period 1990-2002. For this 
purpose a complete estimation of the model is made in each year using only the 
                                                          
3  See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) or Gertler et al. (2001). 
4 According to the relevant equation of the Banco de España’s quarterly model of the Spanish 
economy (see Estrada, et al. 2004) 
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quarterly observations corresponding to that year and the previous years. The same 
chart also shows the estimation of these elasticities with rolling samples. This technique 
differs from the previous one in that, for each new annual estimation, the earliest four 
quarterly observations are removed. 
In the recursive estimations, the evidence of instability in the parameters is very 
weak. However, when rolling regressions are used, the estimations, although not very 
precise, suggest an increase in the sensitivity of consumption to interest rates and to 
both types of wealth in the second half of the sample period. Thus, the relative stability 
of the parameters of the recursive estimation appears to be due essentially to the 
greater weight of the first half of the sample in relation to that of the latest observations, 
which are those that might reflect relevant changes in agents' patterns of behaviour. 
Chart 3.2 depicts the findings of a similar exercise conducted with the private 
productive investment equation of the quarterly model. Once again, the recursive 
estimations of the short-term coefficients for user cost and cash-flow show great 
stability. At the same time, the rolling estimations suggest an increase in the investment 
response to both variables over the course of the nineties, when it is systematically 
above that estimated with the recursive procedure. 
To assess the macroeconomic impact of changes in the coefficients estimated 
with rolling samples, the effects of an increase in interest rates can be compared taking 
as a basis the estimations and value of the variables relating to 1990 and 2002. Table 
3.1 shows the results of this comparison when an increase of 2 pp in short and long-
term rates over a period of three years5 is simulated. As can be seen, the rise in interest 
rates in 1990 would, over three years, entail a GDP level 1.2 pp lower than that of the 
base scenario. The same shock would, in 2002, have an effect of 1.8 pp on the 
economy’s output. The greater sensitivity to the change in interest rates arising in this 
latter simulation can mostly be explained by the estimated increase in the wealth effects 
-generated by the impact of the interest-rate rise on real and stock market prices- and, 
to a lesser extent, by the increase in the substitution effect on consumption and by the 
greater impact of the increase in the user cost on investment. 
                                                          
5 In both cases the average of the estimated parameters relating to the two years before and 
after each date is taken. 
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The evidence presented therefore points to a likely increase in the sensitivity of 
spending to interest rates and wealth in recent years with potentially relevant effects on 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. However, the same evidence suggests 
that these changes are not readily detectable by conventional econometric models. This 
is because such models do not, at least for the moment, offer conclusive statistical proof 
of instability, probably as the result of the absence of sufficient observations relating to 
the new investment and financing pattern which the Spanish economy now appears to 
be following. 
3.2 Aggregation problems and non-linear effects
As seen, while macroeconometric models may provide some useful leads, they 
are, in general, imperfect tools for identifying relevant changes in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Adding to the above-mentioned statistical shortcomings is the 
difficulty of measuring, using aggregate variables, changes in agents' financial position 
that are of relevance for their spending decisions. 
The problem lies in the asymmetry characterising the distribution of the impact of 
a specific change in agents' net worth on their propensity to consume or invest. For 
instance, a household’s spending might be expected to fall significantly in the face of a 
shock that places it in a fragile wealth position. However, if it is in a sufficiently 
comfortable position, its response will naturally be a lesser one. Hence, behind the 
aggregate indicators of a wealth position there may be widely differing distributions 
entailing differentiated responses by private spending to the same types of shocks. 
Against this background, the use of microeconometric data and models may prove 
highly useful. 
Unfortunately, in Spain we do not yet have individual databases of income and 
wealth for households allowing us to supplement the evidence found with 
macroeconomic models. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to detect signs that there may 
have been a significant increase in the likelihood of the wealth position of a segment of 
the sector significantly conditioning its spending decisions in the event of specific shocks 
arising. 
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Pointing along these lines, for example, is the evaluation of household saving. 
Along with the household gross saving ratio in recent years, Chart 3.3 offers an indicator 
reflecting the portion of saving not earmarked for debt service. This is constructed as the 
difference between gross saving and an estimation of repayments of principal on the 
debt incurred by households (see del Río, 2002). The results show how non- committed 
saving, which accounted in 1996 for 8% of disposable income, was below 1% in 2002, 
rebounding slightly thereafter. The low level of this indicator suggests that the household 
sector has a scant savings buffer to withstand significant interest-rate rises. 
Conceivably, were such rises to occur a significant number of households, facing 
restrictions on reducing their asset holdings or resorting to fresh credit, might have to 
adjust their consumption - beyond what a simple substitution effect might explain - so as 
to meet their financial obligations. 
The presence of these financial constraints may lead to an increase in the 
sensitivity of consumption to the interest rate which will hardly be reflected in the 
estimated elasticities of the aggregate consumption function. This is because it is in 
response to a situation - saving and debt as at present but with higher interest rates - for 
which there is no observation in the sample available and which affects the various 
income and wealth strata of the population differently. 
In the event of potential changes in asset prices, the effect may also be expected 
to be more marked in those households whose balance sheets may be more affected. 
Once again, although the sector as a whole maintains a very comfortable financial 
position where liabilities account for less than 10% of total assets, with the increase in 
debt and in the weight of assets sensitive to market reactions, the number of 
households that has moved to a less robust financial position is likely to have increased 
in recent years.  
Unfortunately, there is not enough information to address this issue rigorously. 
With the sole purpose of illustrating its significance, an attempt may be made to bound 
the maximum shock to the price of real and financial tradeable assets that households 
could withstand without their net wealth falling below a certain critical level. To do that, 
however, we must introduce a series of simplifying assumptions which add considerable 
margins of uncertainty. 
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We define a fragile  balance-sheet position as one in which the sum of cash, 
deposits, fixed-income securities and equities, 80% of real-estate assets and 50% of 
insurance technical reserves is lower than debt. That critical level is meant to 
approximate to the wealth position of a household which, having exhausted all holdings 
of cash and tradeable securities, might eventually face difficulties raising additional bank 
financing due to a lack of sufficient collateral. This would make this agent vulnerable to 
any adverse shock. 
Chart 3.4 provides the results of a simple exercise. It presents for the period 
1990-2003 the loss of value (in %) of the set of tradeable assets -excluding cash and 
deposits- that would be needed for households’ wealth to reach the previously defined 
fragility threshold. The exercise is performed for that case in which the balance sheet is 
identical to the average for the sector, and for those in which the same asset structure is 
maintained but the net wealth position (assets minus debt) represents 50%, 10% or 5% 
of the average. It is thus sought to illustrate the position of households which maintain a 
less comfortable financial position than the average and which, given the habitual 
distribution of wealth in most countries, make up a large proportion of the sector. In the 
case of average wealth, results show that the fragility threshold would not be reached at 
any time, not even if the financial and real assets were to lose their entire value. A 
similar situation occurs when wealth is 50% of the average. For a household whose net 
worth is only 10% of the average, the loss of capital that would have placed it below the 
fragility threshold would have fallen from 60% in 1990 to somewhat over 30% in 2003. 
The decline is more pronounced for households whose wealth is assumed to be equal 
to 5% of the average. In this case, the decline in the value of the tradeable assets 
portfolio that would take wealth to the fragility threshold falls from 40% in 1990 to 
virtually zero in 2002.  
In the most vulnerable position of those considered, there will naturally only be a 
minority of households, although the size of this population segment may be non-
negligible. In that regard, it is worth noting that, although there could be significant 
cross-country differences, both in the U.S. and the U.K, a net worth equivalent to 5% of 
the average would be between the 25th and 50th percentile of the wealth distribution 
across households. (see Aizcorbe et al., 2003 and ISER, 2003). 
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Naturally, the exercise is only a simplification of reality. In particular, the 
assumption that the distribution of assets is invariant across households and the 
definition employed of the fragility threshold may logically influence the ability of the 
exercise to describe real situations. The most important conclusion is, therefore, a 
methodological one. Once again, the adjustments in the spending patterns to which 
households with a weaker wealth position should conform in the event of adverse 
shocks in asset prices do have macroeconomic effects that are likely to have become 
more relevant in the recent past. And it is difficult for these to be captured by 
conventional econometric models estimated with time series of macroeconomic 
variables. 
In the case of non-financial enterprises, we fortunately have microeconomic data 
and studies enabling analysis of the sensitivity of their activity to their specific financial 
conditions to be further refined6. According to these studies, indicators of the interest 
burden, debt and the profitability of non-financial corporations significantly affect the 
demand for employment and capital. These types of effects, which are rarely detected in 
equations estimated with aggregate data, appear to exert a non-linear impact. 
Accordingly, faced with a similar increase in financial pressure (in the form of higher 
financial costs or lower profits) the most vulnerable companies restrict their investment 
spending and their hiring decisions by a greater proportion than do companies which 
maintain a more comfortable position. 
This evidence suggests that in the event of an interest-rate rise occurring, the 
interest burden for companies would not only increase to a greater extent in a situation 
such as the present, as opposed to the past, given that companies are more indebted, 
but that the effect of this increase on investment and employment would be more 
pronounced. This is because there would be an increase too in the number of 
companies belonging to the segment with the highest elasticity of investment and 
employment to the financial pressure indicator.  
Chart 3.5 simulates the effects of a 2 pp rise in interest rates on the interest 
burden (measured as the ratio of the cost of debt to the gross operating surplus) for 
companies reporting to the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office in the 
                                                          
6 See Benito and Hernando (2002), Benito et al. (2003) and Hernando and Martínez Carrascal 
(2003). 
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1995-2001 period. The chart shows that the ratio increases from 6 pp in 1995 to 8 pp in 
2002. The effects on investment and employment, according to the elasticities estimated 
by Hernando and Martínez Carrascal (2003), are depicted in the same chart. As can be 
seen, the effect of the hike in interest rates on aggregate investment moves from 
scarcely 0.1% in 1995 to 1.3% in 2001. Likewise, employment would fall in 2001 by 
more than 1.5%, when this decline was scarcely 0.3% in 1995. 
These simulations therefore confirm that the effects of the rises in interest rates 
on investment and employment vary significantly depending on the financial position of 
companies, and that these effects may recently have increased considerably as a result 
of the increase in the sector's debt ratios. 
4. SOME ECONOMIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The foregoing sections offer evidence that the changes in the wealth position of 
Spanish corporations and households may have altered the patterns governing 
consumption and investment and, therefore, the way in which macroeconomic policies - 
particularly monetary policy - act on the real sector. 
These developments, mirrored to a greater or lesser extent in most of the 
industrialised economies, indicate the advisability of regular analysis of the financial 
determinants of domestic spending and, in general, of the stability of the private-sector 
financial position. That could improve the assessment of the economic outlook, and the 
calibration of the effects of alternative policies. 
However, incorporating financial analysis into the regular macroeconomic 
forecasting exercises that underpin central bank conduct is a notably complex task. 
Often, medium and long-term forecasts are based, with a variable degree of flexibility, 
on macroeconometric models that are not very effective in reflecting relevant financial 
developments. As seen, the use of aggregate indicators makes it a painstaking task to 
capture the degree of financial pressure borne by agents and which determines their 
spending and debt decisions following typically non-linear patterns. At the same time, 
the macroeconometric models in use, estimated with time series, might not fully reflect 
the increase in the sensitivity of private spending to interest rates and to asset prices 
that has occurred in recent years. 
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This shortcoming may prove particularly telling when evaluating, in a setting such 
as that at present, the impact of interest rate increases. In most cases, the 
macroeconometric models are estimated with data samples that include no episode in 
which the current level of household and corporate exposure combines with significant 
increases in interest rates. Accordingly, the ability of the models to accurately calibrate 
the effects of a tightening of monetary policy can be questioned. 
One potentially promising avenue to resolve the problems arising from a 
potential change of regime in the estimated equations is the use of micro-founded 
general equilibrium structural models in forecasting exercises7. However, it would be 
premature to evaluate the ability of these models to incorporate with sufficient realism 
the frictions that make trends in flows, stocks and financial asset prices relevant. Thus, 
at least at present, relevant financial developments will inevitably have to be monitored 
in parallel to the obtaining of projections through macroeconometric models, seeking 
flexible arrangements for the interaction of both types of analysis.  
Financial analysis should be based on the exhaustive use of asset price data, 
flows of funds, individual information from the balance sheets of companies and - if 
possible - households, and microeconometric studies that allow more accurate evidence 
to be obtained, albeit in a partial equilibrium context, on how agents change their 
behaviour in the face of significant changes in their financial position. This type of 
analysis may prove a relevant input to the information set used by analysts and central 
banks to adopt projections that deviate from the forecasts produced by macroeconomic 
models. As we have seen, there are reasons to believe that this flexibility in the use of 
the different means of analytical approximation is warranted in order to tackle the 
difficulties posed by models in respect of reflecting the implications of changes in 
corporate and household balance sheets. 
But just as important as the use of financial analysis for designing the scenario 
considered most likely is its role in describing the risks surrounding the forecasts. In this 
respect, it is often worthwhile making projections of relevant financial variables - such as 
wealth, debt or the interest burden - conditional upon the macroeconometric scenario 
chosen and detecting, in this way, potential tensions between the real and financial 
strands that may be used to pick up asymmetries in the probability distribution around 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaun and Evans (2004) or Smets and Wouters. (2004). 
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the central forecasts. As a result of this procedure, central banks may, for example, 
identify the risks of certain potentially unsustainable developments - typically in the 
asset markets -.being corrected. These events, though considered relatively unlikely 
within the regular projection horizon, might be destabilising and must therefore feed 
explicitly or implicitly, into the assessment of the risks facing the economy. 
In terms of monetary policy measures, developments in markets or financial 
flows affecting the evaluation of the future trajectory of activity and prices must evidently 
be taken into consideration. As seen, this probably entails, at present, an implicit gain in 
stature for financial developments within the central bank reaction function, irrespective 
of the technical difficulties of optimally integrating all the analytical parts. 
Arousing greater controversy is the idea that the central bank should seek to 
prevent the emergence or limit the scope of imbalances with the potential to cause 
future crises. In the literature, this possibility has often been formalised discussing 
whether the deviation by financial asset prices from their fundamental or equilibrium 
value should be included in the central bank reaction function along with the habitual 
arguments: inflation and the output gap8.
Moving beyond this excessive simplification, it should be conceded that there is 
no rule or conclusive finding that central bank decisions should be guided exclusively by 
their evaluation of the most likely scenario for output and prices. Conversely, the 
monetary authority could rightly heed less likely developments but ones that may 
ultimately generate disproportionately adverse real effects, especially if society shows a 
certain degree of risk aversion. Accordingly, in those specific episodes, it may be 
analytically justifiable to assign greater weight to financial imbalances than is given in 
normal periods, even though this could, in the most likely scenario, lead to somewhat 
lower-than-target growth rates for activity and prices. 
This type of approach enjoys some empirical support, as there is evidence that 
episodes of financial crises are not completely unpredictable. The combination of 
various real and financial indicators (such as growth of investment, credit, liquidity and 
                                                          
8 E.g. Bernanke and Gertler (2004). For a more general treatment, see Cecchetti et al. (2002) 
and Bean (2003). 
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asset prices) appears to contain some leading informative power on situations of 
financial instability9.
However, the way in which this theoretical approach can be put into practice is 
far from obvious. It is clearly difficult to identify developments that may be described as 
unsustainable both in asset prices and in agents' balance sheets. On the other hand, 
the capacity of monetary policy to contain speculative spirals or widespread waves of 
optimism about the future course of profits or income is uncertain. Finally, a cost-benefit 
analysis of an early tightening of monetary policy in order to prevent possible future 
widespread crisis involves much complexity. 
Yet however difficult the task of regulating monetary policy in the presence of 
financial or asset price imbalances is, economic policy prescriptions are evidently not 
more straightforward if such imbalances arise in specific national economies belonging 
to a monetary union. 
It should be borne in mind that in the euro area there may be non-coincident 
cyclical positions. Foreseeably, then, the common monetary policy will entail different 
real rates and, therefore, it will not exert the same stabilising effect in all the national 
economies. In the countries for which the monetary and financial conditions prove less 
restrictive, there may quite easily be a decline in saving, a rise in debt and an increase 
in the prices of assets which, like housing, are the end-use of most of the bank credit 
extended to households and are traded on markets which, by definition, cannot be 
integrated internationally. Moreover, the rise in real-estate prices tends to refuel the 
upward cycle by generating positive wealth effects on consumption and increasing the 
readiness of households to incur debt as the value of their available collateral becomes 
greater. Hence the absence of an autonomous monetary policy may heighten the 
probability, in certain countries, of expansionary bouts arising which involve an increase 
in the vulnerability of the private non-financial sector’s net wealth position. 
To differing degrees, several Monetary Union Member States, such as Ireland, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain, have already found themselves in this 
position. And the economic policy tools available to curtail the scope of this 
phenomenon are evidently limited. The impossibility of altering the cost of financing 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002), and Detkan and Smets (2003). 
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through an interest-rate rise cannot be offset by the activist use of regulatory policy to 
artificially raise the cost of the supply of credit, as this would generate considerable 
competitive distortions. 
Further, specific structural policies aimed at making markets more flexible may 
occasionally ease supply constraints, such as those conducive to the growth of real-
estate prices, and generally help provide for a smoother adjustment to possible 
corrections of imbalances. However, competition and deregulation alone cannot prevent 
agents from restructuring their balance sheets in the manner they wish. On the contrary, 
the Spanish experience, and that of other countries, shows that the very liberalisation of 
financial markets and heightened competition between intermediaries may contribute to 
increasing credit to the private sector and, by this means, prompt the emergence of 
housing market booms. 
In any event, the contribution of fiscal policy to the possible containment of 
macro-financial imbalances should not be underestimated. Although public finances 
cannot ordinarily be used as an effective tool for regulating cyclical fluctuations, fiscal 
laxity in expansionary periods evidently fuels financial and macroeconomic imbalances 
and increases the risk of their correction causing severe real effects. In this respect, 
Spanish fiscal policy conduct in recent years, which has been more disciplined than in 
other countries in similar positions, has helped restrict the size of imbalances. And if its 
restrictiveness is maintained, it will contribute to preserving economic stability. 
In this regard, national central banks have a crucial mission to perform in the 
communication area. They are in the best possible position to provide clear and rigorous 
public analyses promoting a better evaluation of the risks associated with economic 
agents' investment and financing decisions. 
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Table 3.1 
EFFECTS ON ACTIVITY OF A 2 PP RISE IN INTEREST RATES(*) 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 1990 2000 Diff. 
2000-
1990
1990 2000 Diff. 
2000-
1990
1990 2000 Diff. 
2000-
1990
GDP  -.41 -.58 -.17 -1.05 -1.62 -.57 -1.20 -1.83 -.63 
   of which:         
User cost effects on 
investment 
-.28 -.32 -.04 -.50 -.56 -.06 -.56 -.64 -.08 
Substitution effects on 
consumption 
-.04 -.07 -.03 -.19 -.32 -.13 -.23 -.39 -.09 
Income/cash-flow effect -.03 -.03 - -.13 -.13 - -.14 -.16 -.02 
Wealth effect   -.06 -.16 -.10 -.25 -.64 -.39 -.29 -.67 -.38 
(*)  Changes over the base scenario (as a %) after an increase for three years in short and long-term rates. 
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CHART 2.2
Households
   Sources: Federal Reserve, Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
   (a)   Cumulative four-quarter percentages.
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Non-financial corporations
   Sources: Federal Reserve, Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
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   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Specification of consumption function:
   pc= Private consumption.
   hdy= Household disposable income.
   fw= Financial wealth.
   nfw= Non-financial wealth.
   RR= Real interest rate.
  The dotted lines define the 95% confidence interval of the estimation 
with rolling samples.
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CHART 3.2
Private productive investment function (a)
   Source: Banco de España.
  (a)   Specification of private productive investment function:
pi= Private productive investment.
pye= Production of goods and services.
puc=  User cost.
CF= Cash-flow.
 The dotted lines define the 95% confidence interval of the estimation 
with rolling samples.
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
ROLLING
RECURSIVE
SHORT-RUN COEFFICIENT OF USER COST Į
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12ROLLING
RECURSIVE
SHORT-RUN COEFFICIENT OF CASH FLOW ȕ
( ) 1
1
21 050061240 −
−
−−
−−+∆−∆+∆+−=∆ )(... *pipiCFpucpyepyepi βα
32
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Outstanding balance of household use of disposable income 
account.
   (b)   Gross saving less estimated debt repayments.
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   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)  Required decline in the overall value of tradeable securities and 
real-estate assets. The fragility threshold is defined as Fixed income + 
equities + 0.8 real estate assets + 0.5 insurance technical reserves < 
debt - currency and deposits.
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   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Change over base-line.
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